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SOCIOECONOMIC ROOTS OF MIDDLE EAST RADICALISM
Alan Richards
On 11 September 2001 the United States was attacked by utopian fanatics,followers of a movement inspired by an exceptionally narrow interpreta-
tion of Islam. Although millions of Muslims deplored the attacks, millions of
others also expressed some degree of sympathy for the terrorists. Why do this
movement and other radical Islamic political movements resonate in the Middle
East and the wider Muslim world? The answer, of
course, is profoundly complex. Social, economic, po-
litical, and cultural factors, interacting over many de-
cades, have spawned this particular phenomenon.
Space here permits only a sketch of the social, eco-
nomic, and political issues.
To seek to understand why these murderous acts
took place in no way condones them. Historians who
study Nazism do not justify Auschwitz, and students
of Stalinism do not exonerate the perpetrators of the
Gulag. Understanding why something happens is
much better than incomprehension. If we fail to grasp
the reasons for the attacks on the United States, we
will fail to respond wisely.
A REGION IN CRISIS
Muslims worldwide confront a multidimensional cri-
sis. Like any important historical phenomenon, its
roots are profoundly complex and intertwined,
composed of economic, social, political, and cultural
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dimensions. However important the socioeconomic and political aspects of this
crisis, the cultural difficulties are equally, perhaps uniquely, important. While
these dimensions are conceptually distinct, they are also intimately linked, and
they interact in complex ways. For example, economic failure erodes regimes’ le-
gitimacy and fosters an ideological vacuum, as old ideologies (e.g., Arab nation-
alism) are perceived as failures. The often-noted fact that essentially all serious
political discourse in the region is now phrased in Islamic terms links the cul-
tural dimension to all the others.
This crisis is simultaneously internal and external. It is internal because of
population growth, failed economic policies, local authoritarianism, and cul-
tural issues. It is external because wider forces of globalization play a critical role
in stimulating the growth and spread of radicalism. Much of the region’s eco-
nomic stagnation derives from its weak and distorted integration into the global
economy. At the same time, the kinds of integration that have occurred—specif-
ically, international migration and the spread of global communications—have
themselves contributed to the spread of radicalism. Also, in large part, the failure
of local regimes stems from a failure to manage and engage successfully the
wider process of globalization.1
Today’s Middle East finds itself mired in the “modernization process.” The
transition from a society of illiterate farmers, ruled by a literate, urban elite, into
an urban, mass-educated society with an economy based on industry and ser-
vices has been deeply traumatic. Worse, such change has always and everywhere
spawned grotesque violence. The modern history of both Europe and East Asia,
the only places in the world where this transition has been more or less success-
fully accomplished, often reads like a horror novel: World Wars I and II, Stalin’s
Gulag, Hitler’s Holocaust, Japanese fascism, the Chinese revolution, the “Great
Leap Forward” and its attendant famine, and the Cultural Revolution. The
American experience has also been bloody: the extermination of Native Ameri-
cans, the racial violence of slavery and Jim Crow, and the more than half-million
casualties of its own Civil War. Why should we expect the people of the Middle
East to do better than anyone else?
Much of the violence during this transition has been perpetrated by utopian
fanatics, a category that includes fascists, Nazis, Leninists, and Maoists, and the
followers of al-Qa‘ida. Like their predecessors, today’s Islamic fanatics “imagine
a future” in the “restoration” of the (imagined) conditions of seventh-century
Arabia. Like all fanatics, they believe that they enjoy a monopoly on truth and
that those who disagree “are not merely mistaken, but wicked or mad.”2 They be-
lieve that there is only one goal for humanity, and to reach it they are ready to
wade “through an ocean of blood to the Kingdom of Love.”3 Fanatics have al-
ways built towers of skulls as monuments to their fantasies.
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These particularly virulent fanatics are part of a larger social phenomenon,
the transnational “Salafi movement.” This movement advocates a return to what
its proponents believe to be the strict practices of the earliest Muslims. Their po-
litical ideology asserts that such a return will solve the many difficult problems
facing most Muslim societies. Their slogan declares, “Islam huwwa al-hal”—“Is-
lam [the Salafi interpretation of Islam] is the solution.” Salafis include the fol-
lowers of al-Qa‘ida and the muwahhidiin (or “Unitarians,” as they call
themselves, or the Wahhabis, as others call them), partisans of the official ideol-
ogy of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Several analysts have recently called atten-
tion to the spectrum of opinions within this movement.4
Radical movements have their greatest appeal when the dislocations of the
transition to modernity are most acute. Only the slaughter of World War I and
its chaotic aftermath allowed the Bolsheviks to seize power in Russia. It is incon-
ceivable that Hitler would have come to power without the Treaty of Versailles
and the Great Depression. Famine, governmental collapse, and the horrors of
the Japanese invasion set the stage for China and Chairman Mao Tse-tung. The
siren song of fanatics becomes most seductive when economic, political, social,
and cultural crises combine and when people feel that they have been repeatedly
humiliated.
THE RAGE OF THE YOUNG
The utopian fanaticism of al-Qa‘ida and other groups is nourished by the deep
despair of huge numbers of young Middle Easterners, half of whom are younger
than twenty. The first major social element in the noxious cocktail of religious
radicalism in the region is the phenomenon of the “youth bulge.”
The key demographic facts of the region are that the population is still grow-
ing rapidly but that fertility rates have declined considerably during the past de-
cade. According to the World Bank, the population of the Middle East and
North Africa is now growing at about 2.1 percent per year. At this rate, the popu-
lation will double in about thirty-four years. On the other hand, population
growth rates have fallen sharply in the past ten years, from 3.2 percent in the
mid-1980s to 2.7 percent between 1990 and 1995. Sharp fertility declines caused
this change, and there is reason to expect further declines.
However, this generalization hides substantial variations across countries
and regions (table 1). Although population growth rates and total fertility rates
have fallen markedly in Egypt, Iran, and Tunisia, they have remained stubbornly
high in Gaza and Yemen. Indeed, the total fertility rates in Gaza (7.6 percent)
and Yemen (7.1 percent) are among the highest in the world. Gaza also has a very
high rate in relation to per capita income, a phenomenon also observable in the
Arab Gulf countries.
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Country
Population
(millions, 2000)
Population Growth
Ratea (percent)
TFRb
Afghanistan 26.8 2.5 6.0
Algeria 31.8 2.2 3.4
Bahrain 0.64 1.9 3.0
Egypt 68.5 1.9 3.4
Gaza 1.2 4.5 7.6
Iran 71.9 2.5 4.3
Iraq 24.7 3.6 6.1
Jordan 4.7 3.1 4.8
Kuwait 2.1 1.9 3.4
Lebanon 3.6 1.6 2.3
Libya 6.1 3.7 6.2
Morocco 30.2 2.0 3.4
Oman 2.5 3.3 6.1
Pakistan 141.2 2.4 4.9
Qatar 0.75 1.3 3.5
Saudi Arabia 22.2 3.3 6.4
Somalia 7.0 2.8 7.0
Sudan 33.5 2.9 5.7
Syria 17.8 3.2 5.6
Tunisia 9.6 1.5 2.4
Turkey 66.6 1.6 2.5
United Arab Emirates 2.4 1.6 3.6
West Bank 1.7 3.2 4.9
Yemen 17.5 3.3 7.1
a. Rate of natural increase, 2000.
b. Total fertility rate, 2000. The TFR measures the number of children that a “statistically average” woman
will have during her lifetime.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, available at http://www.census.gov/ipc/prod/wp98/wp98.pdf
TABLE 1
POPULATION DATA FOR SELECTED MIDDLE EASTERN
AND OTHER MUSLIM COUNTRIES
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Populations will continue to grow despite falling fertility rates because fertil-
ity remains well above replacement levels and because, as a result of past popula-
tion growth, many women will soon enter childbearing years (“demographic
momentum”). Many countries in the region will experience a considerable rise
in their population during the next fifteen years (figure 1). The population may
reach roughly six hundred million by 2025, some six times greater than the
1950s. Such growth poses numerous economic challenges, from food and water
to jobs and housing.
Several implications follow from this demographic pattern. First, and most
important, is that the majority of those in the Middle East are young—half the
Arab population, 54 percent of Iranians, and 52 percent of Pakistanis are youn-
ger than twenty years old (table 2). (By contrast, only slightly more than
one-quarter of the populations of developed countries—the United States, Eu-
ropean Union, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan—are under twenty.)
Two-thirds of the people in the region are under thirty. It is not likely that this
picture will change markedly in the next generation. By 2025 the number of peo-
ple aged fourteen or younger will roughly double; in that year, about two out
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aPopulation numbers for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states
exclude the noncitizen population. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census
FIGURE 1
GROWTH IN POPULATION FROM 2000 TO 2015
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Percentage of Population That Is:
Country Under 15 years old Under 20 years old
Afghanistan 43 53
Algeria 38 50
Bahrain 31 38
Egypt 36 47
Gaza 52 62
Iran 43 54
Iraq 47 58
Jordan 43 54
Kuwait 32 42
Lebanon 30 41
Libya 48 58
Morocco 36 47
Oman 41 51
Pakistan 34 52
Qatar 27 35
Saudi Arabia 43 52
Somalia 44 54
Sudan 45 56
Syria 46 57
Tunisia 32 42
Turkey 31 41
United Arab Emirates 32 41
West Bank 45 56
Yemen 48 60
DCsa 19 26
LDCsb 34 43
a. Developed countries—European Union, Japan, United States, Canada, Australia/
New Zealand.
b. Less developed countries.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, available at http://www.census.gov/ipc/prod/wp98/wp98.pdf
TABLE 2
YOUTH AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATIONS
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of five Near Easterners are projected to be younger than twenty.5 When one asks
such questions as “What is the impact of our policies on Arabs?” we are in fact
asking, “What is the impact of our policies on young people?”
Second, the rapid fall in fertility may lead to a rapid decrease in the
“dependency ratio” (the number of people under fifteen or over sixty-five com-
pared to the working-age population).6 When this has happened elsewhere, as in
East Asia in the 1970s and 1980s, dramatic increases in national savings rates
have ensued. Perhaps the demographic change caused the savings change. How-
ever, whether or not such savings find their way into productive and job-creat-
ing investment depends on many other factors as well. Nevertheless, in the sea of
“bad news” about the region’s political economy, it is well to be reminded that
not all is bleak.
For the first time in history, many of these youths have received some amount
of education. Although the region lags behind other parts of the developing
world, school enrollment and literacy have risen dramatically during the past
generation. Today most Arabs and Iranians can read and write; this is not yet the
case in Pakistan, where only two-fifths of adults are literate.
There is considerable variation in education among countries. More than
three-quarters of the adults in Iran and Kuwait are literate, while there is be-
tween one-half to two-thirds adult literacy in Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Tunisia, Saudi
Arabia, and Syria. Only about half or fewer of the adults are literate in Egypt,
Morocco, Sudan, and Yemen. But even in Egypt, a laggard in this respect, virtu-
ally all children attend school. School enrollment has exploded throughout the
region, though the pattern has been uneven and there is still a huge gap between
girls and boys. Most boys were in school long before their sisters. In Algeria,
Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, and Tunisia, nearly all children attend pri-
mary school, and roughly 60 percent of all adolescents are enrolled in secondary
school. In Saudi Arabia, all boys are enrolled in primary school, but only 75 per-
cent of girls are in school. In the least developed countries, most girls do not at-
tend school. In Sudan and Yemen, for example, nearly all boys are enrolled in
primary school, whereas only 40 percent of girls attend. In Morocco over
one-third, and in Oman roughly one-fourth, of girls are not in primary school.
Despite the appalling waste of human resources such undereducating of women
represents, the past generation has seen an educational revolution throughout
the entire region.
Certain points should be noted. First, the gap in education between girls and
boys may be a factor in the current popularity of radical Islam.7 A rather hopeful
view argues that Islamic radicalism’s relentless focus on rigid gender segregation
is something that only the current generation will experience. In the past,
2 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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neither men nor women were educated; in the future (and the future is now, in
Iran), everyone will be at least marginally educated.
Second, rapidly spreading education is part of the social background of what
has been called the “crisis of authority” in Islam.8 How is it that any engineer can
issue his own fatwa when in previous centuries such pronouncements were the
exclusive prerogative of a small, relatively privileged elite of traditionally edu-
cated Islamic scholars (the ’ulama)? The widespread diffusion of education, in
conjunction with the absence of hierarchical controls on religious edicts in Is-
lam (in contrast to, say, Roman Catholicism), is creating a “religious anarchy”
that provides the cultural space in which radicals can promulgate and advocate
their messages.
Third, the quality of education leaves much to be desired. Education in the re-
gion stresses rote memorization, with little emphasis on analytical thinking and
problem solving. Expectations have been raised, but the skills needed to meet
those expectations have not been imparted. Millions of young men now have
enough education to make the old, dirty jobs unsatisfying but have not acquired
the skills needed to perform successfully in the modern, hypercompetitive,
global economy.
Fourth, thanks to past birth rates, the Middle East has the most rapidly grow-
ing labor force in the world; between 1990 and 1998 it grew at 3.4 percent per
year. Algeria’s labor force is growing at 4.9 percent a year, Syria’s at 4.8 percent,
and Yemen’s at 5.6 percent. Compare this to the labor force growth in the Euro-
pean Union of 0.4 percent per year during the past decade, and the American la-
bor force at about 0.8 percent. In other words, the labor force in the Middle East
is growing four times faster than the American labor force and eight times faster
than the European Union’s. Although the rate of growth attributable to past
population growth will decelerate in some countries, such as Tunisia, during the
next ten to fifteen years, declines in fertility are always accompanied (plausibly,
largely caused) by an increase in female education, which enables women to en-
ter the labor market. It is highly unlikely that the growth of the supply of labor
will decelerate within the medium term.
At the same time, the demand for labor has grown sluggishly. Simple eco-
nomics tells us that given such a mismatch between the growth of demand and
of supply, either wages will fall, unemployment will rise, or (most likely) some
combination of both will occur, the precise mix varying with specific labor mar-
ket structures. Government policies have not only reduced the rate of growth of
demand for labor but also fostered inflexible labor markets. Decades of govern-
ment job guarantees for graduates have induced students to seek any degree, re-
gardless of its contribution to productivity. Governments cannot now provide
the necessary jobs, and statist policies impede private-sector job creation.
R I C H A R D S 2 9
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Current levels of unemployment are high (table 3) and will probably worsen.
In some countries the level of unemployment has been similar to that in the
United States during the worst days of the Great Depression. Real wages have
stagnated for nearly a generation, and poverty levels have either remained about
the same or increased during the past decade. Unemployment and low wages
primarily affect young, uneducated urbanites, whose anger is fuel for political
unrest.
As usual, conflicting estimates of the “extent of poverty”—an inherently sub-
jective concept—exist. One rather sanguine view is that of the World Bank,
which holds that, compared with other regions of the developing world, the
Middle East and North Africa collectively have “relatively limited” poverty.9 The
number of poor persons—defined as those with yearly incomes of less than a
“purchasing power parity” figure of $365 per year—is given at 5 percent, and the
depth and severity of poverty is low. Many observers have objected to this analy-
sis on the grounds that it set the poverty line too low relative to per capita in-
comes.10 From a political perspective, what counts is the social definition of
poverty. Poverty is inevitably partly relative. Poor people in Egypt, Jordan, or Al-
geria do not compare themselves with the poor in Bangladesh or Madagascar;
3 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
Country
Unemployment Rate
(percentage)
Remarks
Algeria 30 1999
Egypt 12a 2000
Iran 20–25 2001
Jordan 15
Official rate. CIA gives
25–30 (1999)
Lebanon 18 1998
Libya 29 2000
Morocco 15–22 2000
Saudi Arabia 14–18 Higher among graduates
Syria 12–15 1999
Tunisia 16 1999
Yemen 35 1999
a. Some estimates show 20.
Source: for Saudi Arabia, U.S. Embassy, Riyadh, New York Times, 26 August 2001; for Iran, Eric Rouleau, Le
Monde Diplomatique, www.en.monde-diplomatique.fr/2001/06/05iran; for all others, MEDEA Institute (Euro-
pean Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Co-operation), and CIA World Factbook.
TABLE 3
UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
A COMPENDIUM OF ESTIMATES
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they feel “poor” relative to their fellow Egyptians, Jordanians, or Algerians. It
follows that higher estimates of poverty are more politically relevant.
What are the political consequences of poverty? It provides a fertile recruiting
ground for opponents of regimes and therefore poses a challenge to governance,
in at least two ways. First, some of the poor, particularly the younger ones with
limited education, join violent opposition movements. Today’s basic profile for
a violent militant is a young man with some education who may also have
recently moved to the city. Such young people are often unemployed or have jobs
below their expectations. In North Africa they are colorfully known as the
hetistes, “those who lean against the wall.”11 Evidence from Egyptian arrest
records suggests that many of those arrested for violent activities against the
regime come from shantytowns surrounding large cities, usually the poorest
urban areas in the country. It has been argued that the rise of Islamic radicalism
in Central Asia is related to the problems of youth unemployment.12
The violent opposition toward the government in Upper Egypt during the
past two decades is also related to poverty. The Sa‘id (Middle and Upper Egypt)
is the poorest region in the country. As elsewhere in the country, poverty has
been rising there in the past ten years, thanks to the collapse of unskilled wages.
Whereas real wages rose over 350 percent in real terms from 1973 to 1985
(largely due to emigration for work in the Gulf states), the decrease in regional
oil production and the war with Iraq led to the return of many of these economic
migrants. Such forces have brought wages down by over 50 percent for unskilled
workers. As Sa‘idis began moving into the cities, the problem of Islamic radical-
ism appeared in more visible locations—Egypt’s major cities.
The creation of jobs is particularly difficult since the remedy in the long run
will likely worsen the problem in the short run. The demand for labor has grown
slowly because output growth has lagged and because of specific policy biases
against labor-intensive, job-creating growth. Statist policies not only retard
growth but raise the capital intensity—and reduce the job-creating impact—of
whatever growth does occur. Changing these policies would require laying off
workers in state-owned enterprises and the bureaucracy, a move that frightens
many government leaders.
NOT BY BREAD ALONE
The unemployment problem is the most politically volatile economic issue fac-
ing the Middle East. It encourages many relatively educated, young, urban resi-
dents to support radical Islamic political movements. Yet we must be cautious
here, for the “youth bulge” and rampant unemployment are at least as severe in
sub-Saharan Africa, but we hear little of Congolese international terrorism.
There are many complex cultural forces behind Islamic movements; no
R I C H A R D S 3 1
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economic determinism is implied here. To understand how and why discontent
spawned by unemployment takes a specific political and ideological form, we
cannot rely alone on demography and economics. We must also look at political
structures and ideological environments.
The Ayatollah Khomeini is reported to have said, “The revolution is about Islam,
not the price of melons.” Deeper issues of identity and legitimacy are at stake.
For example, it should be remembered that although unemployed, frustrated
young men can turn to Islamism, they can also turn to drugs and crime, to apa-
thy, indifference, muddling through, dogged hard work, or any number of other
personal “coping” strategies. The decision to join a revolutionary movement is
an idiosyncratic and deeply personal one. Socioeconomic contexts may be im-
portant for understanding these movements, but they hardly provide a complete
explanation for them. Nevertheless, the huge numbers of discontented young
men and women are a major threat to the internal stability of the Middle East.
Youth politics always and everywhere focuses not merely on material goods
but also on questions of identity, justice, and morality. Consider, for example,
the politics of the American “baby boomers” of the 1960s. Impatience and
Manichean thinking are among the burdens of youth politics, whether in Berke-
ley or Cairo. Also, as criminologists point out, resort to violence is overwhelm-
ingly a phenomenon of youth. The millions of unemployed and underemployed
young men gathered in the specific political and cultural milieux of the region
constitute one of the tangled roots of radicalism.
THE JUNGLE OF THE CITIES
The discontent of these young people is exacerbated by the fact that most of
them now live in cities—cities that are crumbling. The number of Middle East
urban dwellers has increased by about a hundred million in thirty-five years.
Roughly half the population now live in cities, and the number is expected to
rise from 135 million to over 350 million by 2025. From 1985 to 1990 the great-
est growth was in secondary cities (6 percent), compared to that (3.8 percent) of
the nineteen largest cities with populations of over one million in 1990. This
trend continued throughout the 1990s. Public services and utilities are already
overwhelmed. In Jordan and Morocco, for example, one-third of the urban pop-
ulation lacks adequate sewerage, and water supplies are often erratic. Govern-
ments that attempt to provide these services through heavy subsidies only strain
their budgets and thwart the investments needed to extend and improve what
exists. As a result, regimes lose their legitimacy in the minds of those who spend
much of their time thinking about what they see.
Rapid urbanization erodes the government’s legitimacy in at least two ways.
First, it strains the infrastructure and budget. The government’s perceived
3 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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inability to provide housing, sewerage, potable water, and garbage collection
raises doubts about its fundamental purpose. Second, the process of migration
to the cities is always disorienting. Whether in Ayacucho or Asyut, the mixture
of rural-urban migration with discontented provincial intellectuals proves to be
highly toxic (if not yet fatal) to existing governments. The newly arrived mi-
grants provide fertile fishing ground for Islamic militants, particularly when the
migrant cannot find work and the (allegedly) decadent mores of the cities shock
his sensibilities.
Consider Karachi, Pakistan. This city has grown from a population of one
million at the time of the nation’s independence to eleven million today, and it
may grow to twenty million by 2015. Its managers are overwhelmed, as are its
systems that provide water, electricity, transportation, health care, and educa-
tion. In the slums, there is only one place that is cool when outside it is hot, clean
when outside it is filthy, and calm when outside there is chaos—the mosque.
Government policy has played an important (if negative) role here. Government
incapacity and the resulting “abandonment of public space” to private Islamic
schools, clinics, hospitals, and welfare agencies have done much to advance the
fanatics’ cause.
Some may object that (as far as one can tell) most of those responsible for the
crimes of 11 September were privileged and educated. This, however, is entirely
to be expected. George Orwell once quipped that “revolutionaries can always
pronounce their aitches.” Revolutionaries are often, even typically, from rela-
tively privileged backgrounds. Lenin was no muzhik, and Mao Tse-tung was the
son of a rich peasant; yet the political and economic conditions of Russia and
China when they were young profoundly shaped their opinions and ideals. Peo-
ple who knew Mohammed Atta (one of the 11 September hijackers) in Germany
heard him speak of the “fat cats” running Egypt. It is no surprise that the “shock
troops” of a revolutionary movement are educated and privileged. It would be
quite ahistorical, however, to argue that their existence—or their appeal—is in-
dependent of the social conditions of their societies. Monocausal explanations
of complex historical phenomena are always foolish.
It is also worth remembering that radicalism reaches far wider than al-Qa‘ida.
Movements in Algeria, Egypt, Palestine, Pakistan, Yemen, Central Asia, and
Southeast Asia include many diverse actors.
A HISTORICAL ANALOGY
The fanatics of al-Qa‘ida display a close resemblance to the nihilists and other
terror-prone, would-be revolutionaries of nineteenth-century Russia, as
described by the Hungarian writer Tibor Szamuely: “The Russian intelligentsia
was a social stratum composed of those politically aroused, vociferous, and
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radical members of the educated classes who felt totally estranged from society. . . .
The alienation of the intelligentsia from society was to a great extent inherent in
the country’s rudimentary social structure. . . .[U]nlike the West, Russia had no
interest groups capable of giving strength, support, and substance to the intel-
lectuals’ protest. . . .The Russian intelligentsia had neither a place nor a stake in
the existing order of things.”13 Szamuely goes on to say that just as the educated
young men who piloted planes into the World Trade Center could easily have
found well-paying jobs, there were considerable opportunities within the tsarist
bureaucracy for men of talent. However, like the al-Qa‘ida mujahidiin, many
Russian intellectuals chose to spurn that path. “The intelligent . . . himself re-
jected the idea of serving a system founded on injustice, oppression and mis-
ery.”14 That is to say, ideas matter, and ideas are not formed in a socioeconomic
vacuum.
Further similarities emerge. For example, in nineteenth-century Russia, as in
the past generation of the Muslim world, there was a dramatic expansion of uni-
versities, whose doors opened for the first time to less privileged young men, of-
ten from rural backgrounds. “[After the Crimean War,] there was a marked shift
in the social composition of the student body in the universities. . . .[I]t came to
be made up more and more of so-called raznochintsy, ‘people of diverse rank’:
sons of clergymen, peasants, petty officials, army officers, artisans, and trades-
men who had become divorced by virtue of their education or inclination from
their fathers’ social station and could no longer fit into the official estate system.”15
In a manner that Szamuely finds “very understandable,” instead of feeling grati-
tude for the opportunity for upper mobility the “student-raznochinets brought
with him a deep sense of the injustices of Russian life . . . [that] rapidly turned
into hatred of the existing order.”16 Szamuely also notes that the intolerant
utopianism of the student revolutionaries was a mirror-image of the violence
of the tsarist state. Here too there are important parallels in many Muslim
countries.
THE FAILURE OF GOVERNMENTS
The incompetence and authoritarianism of many Middle East and Muslim gov-
ernments represent vital sources of the phenomenon of Islamic radicalism.
These governments are overwhelmingly unelected, unaccountable, and corrupt.
They provide no legitimate outlets for the discontentment of youth. Unsurpris-
ingly, the young despise them. The old ideologies of these governments, largely
varieties of nationalism, are perceived as failures. They have delivered neither
material goods nor a sense of dignity at home or abroad. The half-century-long
failure of Arab states to resolve the Palestinian situation and the inability of Pa-
kistan to ease the lot of Kashmiri Muslims have contributed to the evident
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corrosion of the regimes’ legitimacy. Nationalism has not disappeared; it has
been assimilated into the Islamists’ discourse.
Governments are rightly faulted for their dismal economic performance.
During the past twenty years, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (consisting of thirty countries) has seen its members’ per capita
incomes rise at about 1.4 percent per year. East Asia (excluding Japan) has, of
course, grown much faster, at 5.8 percent per year—a rate that doubled per ca-
pita incomes in twelve and one-half years. Even Latin America, with its notori-
ous “lost decade” of the debt-ridden 1980s, saw per capita incomes rise at just
under 1 percent per year during the past two decades. In contrast, per capita in-
comes in the Arab states today are little different from what they were in 1980;
some analysts would argue that their per capita movement has actually been
negative, which is clearly the case in Saudi Arabia. Real wages and labor produc-
tivity there are about the same as in 1970.17 This performance is worse than that
of any other major country in the world, except for the countries of the former
Soviet Union; even sub-Saharan Africa has done better.
The reasons for this woeful record are well understood. A combination of vast
economic rents, authoritarian and centralizing states, and the fashion for import
substitution in the third quarter of the twentieth century generated inward-
looking political economies dominated by the state. Dismantling such
structures has proved difficult, and the process of economic reform has often
been tentative, dilatory, and slow. It is for this reason that the demand for labor
has grown slowly while the supply has soared. Government economic failure is
the other “blade of the scissors,” producing unemployment, falling real wages,
and stagnant per capita incomes.
WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
How can the United States reduce the appeal of the utopian fanatics? It should
approach the problem with considerable humility. Take the economic crisis. A
strong case can be made that the economies of the Middle East have failed be-
cause of institutional and political deficiencies. Outsiders can do very little to
promote institutional change, as the United States learned to its dismay in Rus-
sia and elsewhere. The deep cultural crisis of contemporary Islam’s confronta-
tion with modernity can be resolved only by Muslims.
The Middle East has been slow to embrace the international consensus (the
“Washington consensus”) on what policies should be adopted to improve its
economic management. Washington’s view holds that only a private-sector,
export-oriented economic development strategy has a chance of coping with
the challenges facing the region. This view is best articulated by the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund.18 However, there are many other
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adherents, particularly in the U.S. government and American academia and
think tanks.
No one has formulated a policy mix for the Middle East more persuasive
than that of the Washington consensus. The usual recommendation is to
push the regimes harder to “reform their economies.” Although the consen-
sus may be the best available strategy, it too is likely to fail. This may be es-
pecially true for the very poor nations and the relatively rich states of the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
For the poorest countries, on the consensus view, exports are highly un-
likely to provide either adequate food (this is an increasingly serious prob-
lem) or a sufficient number of jobs. The domestic productive capacity has
been (and is being) damaged by population growth and property-rights is-
sues (e.g., groundwater), and natural-resource degradation may have gone
so far as to be difficult to reverse. Further, because of the growth of the labor
force, the provision of jobs via the “private-sector-led export model” is not
credible; the infrastructure is too poor, and the labor force is overwhelmingly
illiterate. The grim facts are that, at best, economic development in such
countries is mainly a “holding action,” designed to prevent further deteriora-
tion and a consequent complete breakdown of order. The danger is that a
breakdown will lead to the anarchy of a Somalia or Afghanistan, with the
concomitant risk of the development of terrorist safe havens.
The Washington consensus does not easily fit the GCC states. The problems
there are largely fiscal. The relief that the last several years have afforded appears
unlikely to last; the “rent ceiling” of oil given by alternative energy production
costs is about twenty-five dollars per barrel. Even at this maximum price, reve-
nue would be short. The large numbers on the expenditure side arise from the
perceived need for governments to spend heavily on defense, consumer subsi-
dies, and public-sector job creation. The GCC states have local populations that
are thoroughly dependent upon, and expect to receive, a wide variety of con-
sumer subsidies. Their governments’ ability to meet their side of the social con-
tract is doubtful. Most importantly, the large majority of nationals (in
Kuwait the figure is 80 percent) are employed by the state. Consequently, short-
falls in government revenue translate quickly into difficulties with employment
creation. The private sector is too dependent on state largesse, and too small to
take up the slack. Most importantly, the countries of the Gulf have limited com-
parative advantages in non-oil goods or services. Wage rates, seriously inflated
by past oil rents and current consumer subsidies, are far too high to compete in
low-wage activities, but skills have not been developed to compete for more so-
phisticated work.
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The orthodox economic growth strategy also faces formidable obstacles else-
where, where it might plausibly work, such as in the “newly industrializing
countries” of North Africa, Egypt, Iran, and possibly Jordan. Here the needed
policy shifts may themselves be destabilizing, not only because the necessary
changes involve austerity but because challenges face special interests that are
major props of regime support and that occupy important, subsidized positions
within the bureaucracy. Examples range from East Bank Jordanians to Egyptian
workers in state-owned enterprises.
In the long run, the needed changes are also likely to destabilize in another
way. Attracting the necessary volume of investment will almost certainly require
greater governmental accountability and more transparent rules of the eco-
nomic game. This is not to say that democracy is needed for growth but only to
suggest that it is unlikely that regimes will attract the necessary private capital
from their own citizens, or foreigners, if they persist in arbitrary, authoritarian
practices. Since there is good reason to suppose that continued authoritarianism
is in itself one of the causes for radicalism, and since continued unaccountable
governance undermines economic growth, institutional change in the direction
of greater participation and enhanced governmental accountability may consti-
tute a key element of long-run stability.19 The problem is, of course, that the
transition from the current situation of authoritarian unaccountability is likely
to be a rocky road.
The truth is that outsiders are largely (but not entirely) irrelevant to the pro-
cess of deep institutional and cultural change that, alone, can ultimately over-
come the profound, multitiered crisis facing the Muslim world. The United
States can and must refrain from behavior that will provide fuel for fanatical ar-
guments and discourage those in the Middle East who would respond differ-
ently to their own societies’ crises. U.S. foreign policy can play a role here. It must
also continue to seek a settlement in the conflict between the Palestinians and Is-
raelis. Any resolution will be, to say the least, enormously difficult. However, the
United States will not have peace with the young Arabs until that situation is
resolved.
The United States also has an opportunity to contribute to change by modify-
ing its policies, especially toward Iran. U.S. energy policies have long been stun-
ningly myopic, and Americans continue to pay at the pump for many a Salafi
madraseh (school).
Regrettably, current indications are that U.S. policies will do little to amelio-
rate these problems. There is a tendency in current U.S. discourse to attribute the
entirety of the problem to cultural failings in the Muslim world and to imagine
that military power can tamp down if not resolve complex social, economic, po-
litical, and cultural struggles. This is unlikely.20 Sadly, it appears probable that
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both U.S. behavior and regional trends will continue to water the roots of Is-
lamic radicalism.
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